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THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the California Supreme Court is reported at 
People V. Bovde. 46 Cal* 3d 212, 758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal* Rptr* 83 
( 1983 ) .
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Judgment of the California Supreme Court was entered on 
August 11, 1988. The Jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28
1
U.S.C» section 1257 (a). The petition for writ of certiorari was 
timely filed and granted on June 5, 1989.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This case involves the eighth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 15, 1981 petitioner Richard Boyde robbed a 
7-Eleven store in Riverside, California of thirty-three dollars 
and kidnapped the night clerk at gunpoint. In a nearby orange 
grove Boyde ordered the clerk to his knees and shot him three 
times, killing him. People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 228, 758 
p.2d 25, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988).
Boyde was tried and convicted of robbery, kidnapping for 
robbery and first degree murder. Mjl The jury found that Boyde 
personally used a firearm in perpetrating all three offenses, and 
specially found that Boyde "personally killed [the victim] with 
express malice aforethought and premeditation and deliberation." 
Id. The jury also found two special circumstances: murder during 
the commission of a robbery and murder during the commission of 
kidnapping. Id.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution 
introduced substantial evidence in aggravation regarding Boyde’s 
extensive history of violent crime. Idat 247-48. Five 
witnesses testified that they had been robbed by Boyde. Jd. at 
247. Two witnesses testified that Boyde participated in an 
assault on them. Id. Another witness testified that Boyde was
2
in a group which was throwing bricks at her car. Id.
In mitigation, Boyde presented testimony by family and 
friends of his poor and disadvantaged background, health 
problems, poor academic performance and frequent trouble with 
police. Id. Boyde also presented testimony by a psychologist of 
his "inadequate personality with limited internal resources and 
low self-esteem." The psychologist further testified that Boyde 
is often depressed and socially isolated, and that his 
intelligence level is "on the edge between dull-normal and 
borderline." Id.
Following Boyde's presentation of mitigating evidence, the 
jury was instructed that the penalty for a defendant found guilty 
of murder of the first degree, where special circumstances are 
found, shall be death or life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole. (J.A. 48).
To guide the jury in their determination of the appropriate 
penalty, they were read CALJIC 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1979) which is 
designed to guide the jury*s consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating evidence. The instruction directs the jury that it 
"shall consider all of the evidence which has been received 
during any part of the trial of this case." The instruction then 
enumerates eleven factors that the jury "shall consider, take 
into account and be guided by ... if applicable."! (J.A. 48).
1. The eleven factors, as read to Boyde’s jury, are as 
follows:
(a) the circumstances of the crime of which the 
Defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the
3
The eleventh factor, hereinafter "factor (k)", directs the 
jury to consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the 
crime." (J.A. 49). The jury was further instructed that "the
existence of any special circumstances found to be true;
(b) the presence or absence of criminal activity by the 
Defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or 
violence;
(c) the presence or absence of any prior felony 
conviction;
(d) whether or not the offense was committed while a 
Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance;
(e) whether or not the victim was a participant in the 
Defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
(f) whether or not the offense was committed under any 
special circumstances which the Defendant reasonably believed to 
be moral justification or extenuation for his conduct;
(g) whether or not the Defendant acted under extreme 
duress or under the substantial domination of another person;
(h) whether or not at the time of the offense the 
capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects 
of intoxication;
(i) the age of the Defendant at the time of the crime;
(j) whether or not the Defendant was an accomplice to 
the offense and his participation in the commission of the 
offense was relatively minor, and,
(k) any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity 
or the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. 
The word extenuate means to lessen the seriousness of a crime as 
by giving an excuse.
(J.A. 48-49).
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word extenuate means to lessen the seriousness of a crime as by 
giving an excuse." Id.
The jury was then read CALJIC 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979) which 
sets out the jury’s duty to weigh aggravating and mitigating 
factors in imposing the appropriate sentence.2
The jury fixed the penalty at death. 46 Cal. 3d at 221.
The Supreme Court of California, on automatic appeal, upheld the 
jury’s death verdict, specifically finding that CALJIC 8.84.1 
properly permitted the jury to consider all evidence presented by 
the defense in mitigation. Id^ at 251. The court also found 
that CALJIC 8,84.2 did not impermissibly require the jury to 
return a death verdict unless appropriate under all the 
circumstances of the case. Id. at 253.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court must affirm Boyde’s sentence because the jury 
instructions given satisfy the constitutional requirements of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments.
A death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of a 
defendant’s relevant mitigating factors. In considering whether
2. After having heard all of the evidence and having heard 
and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take 
into account and be guided by the applicable factors of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been 
instructed.
If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a 
sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall 
impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life 
without the possibility of parole.
(J.A. 49).
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the instruction accorded the defendant his constitutional rights 
the question is ’’what a reasonable juror could have understood 
the charge as meaning.”
A reasonable juror could not have interpreted CALJIC 8.84.1 
as excluding from consideration all of Boyde’s mitigating 
evidence. The language of factor (k) was non-exclusive and 
directed the jury to consider any circumstance which would 
extenuate or lessen the gravity of the crime.
CALJIC 8.84.1 also instructed the jury to "consider all of 
the evidence which had been presented during any part of the 
trial of this case." Boyde presented an abundance of evidence at 
the penalty phase relating to his character and background. The 
jury could not have reasonably believed that though they were 
permitted to hear this evidence, they could not consider it.
In addition, both counsel argued at length as to the proper 
weight to be given Boyde’s evidence. The prosecutor made 
repeated references to evidence offered by Boyde at the penalty 
stage. Defense counsel further referred to factor (k) as a 
catchall provision in his argument for giving great weight to 
Boyde’s mitigating evidence. After listening to testimony on 
Boyde’s mitigating evidence and counsels’ arguments as to its 
weight, the jury could not have concluded that this evidence 
could not be considered.
The portion of CALJIC 8.84.2 to which Boyde objects can 
only reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the jury must 
weigh the relevant factors presented and come to reasoned moral
6
judgment as to the appropriate penalty. The instruction seeks to 
prevent the jury from deciding on one punishment or another 
simply because of their reluctance to decide the ultimate fate of 
the defendant. This interpretation is entirely consistent with 
statements made by both counsel during penalty phase argument. 
CALJIC 8.84.2 did not, as Boyde argues, compel the jury to return 
a sentence of death, unless they felt it to be appropriate under 
all the circumstances.
An examination of the entire charge given the jury lends 
further support to the conclusion that the jury understood the 
nature and scope of its constitutional duty. Boyde argues that 
jurors may have believed that the weighing process was 
quantitative and not qualitative and therefore did not comply 
with the requirements of the constitution. This argument is 
directly refuted by counsel’s statements during both opening and 
closing penalty phase arguments. Both counsel repeatedly and 
unequivocally informed jurors that the decision was not to be 
based on any mechanical counting process. Thus, the reasonable 
juror could not have interpreted the instruction as requiring a 
mere mechanical counting of the aggravating and mitigating 
factors as Boyde contends. Instead, the instruction clearly 
called for a weighing of the relative substantiality and 
persuasiveness of the relevant factors. The personal decision of 
each juror that Boyde should be sentenced to death was subsumed 
within his or her decision that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
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ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM BOYDE’S SENTENCE BECAUSE CALJIC
8.84.1 COMPORTED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EIGHTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
This Court established in Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 586 
(1978), that ”[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death 
penalty statute must not preclude consideration of a defendant’s 
relevant mitigating factors." Id. at 608. Boyde seeks to have 
his sentence vacated on the grounds that the jury was 
impermissibly precluded form considering evidence of his 
character and background. Boyde*s claim must fail as CALJIC 
8.84.1 instructed his jury to consider any mitigating evidence 
presented,
A. Because CALJIC 8.84.1 did not preclude consider a t_i_pn__of 
Bovde *s character and background evidence this Court 
must affirm his sentence.
This Court stated in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 
(1978), that in considering whether an instruction delivers an 
accurate interpretation of the law, the question is "what a 
reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning."
Id. at 541 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315 ( 1985)). 
To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an 
instruction the Court "must focus initially on the specific 
language challenged." Id. "If the specific instruction fails 
constitutional muster, [the Court must] then review the 
instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a 
correct interpretation of the law." Id. In this case the
8
language of factor (k) is challenged and must be examined for 
constitutional infirmities.
1 . The language of factor (k) was non-exclusive and
permitted the_jurv to consider evidence of Bovde*s
character and background.
The specific language challenged, factor (k), could not be 
interpreted in a manner that would render it unconstitutional. 
This court held in Lockett that "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that the sentencer in . . . capital case[s] 
must not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, 
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . . that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 
438 U.S. at 604. (emphasis in original).
Lockett involved Ohio’s sentencing scheme, which allowed 
consideration of only three mitigating factors. The statute 
required the trial court to impose the death penalty upon 
Lockett’s conviction for "aggravated murder with specifications, 
unless it found "that (1) the victim had induced or facilitated 
the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have 
committed the offense but for the fact that she *was under 
duress, coercion, or strong provocation,* or (3) the offense was 
primarily the product of [Lockett’s] psychosis or mental 
deficiency." Id. at 593-94. None of these mitigating factors 
were found to be applicable and the sentencing judge imposed the 
death penalty. Id. at 594.
The Ohio statute was found unconstitutional because it did 
not permit individualized consideration of Lockett’s mitigating
9
circumstances. Id» at 606-08. Lockett had offered evidence that
she played a relatively minor role in a robbery which resulted in 
a homicide actually perpetrated by another; that she had 
previously committed no major offenses; and that a psychological 
report described her prognosis for rehabilitation as favorable.
Id, at 594. This Court found that since the limited range of 
mitigating circumstances allowed by the statute did not permit 
the sentencer to consider this evidence, the statute was 
incompatible with the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 
609.
In contrast to the Ohio statute, CALJIC 8.84.1 permitted 
consideration of all evidence offered by Boyde concerning his 
character and background. The jury was given a list of eleven 
statutory factors to consider, some aggravating and others 
mitigating. The last was factor (k) which directed the jury to 
consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of 
the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." 
(J.A. 49). The language of factor (k) was plainly non-exclusive. 
It permitted consideration of "any other circumstance" offered as 
evidence which would call for a sentence of less than death. 
Coming at the end of the list, it acted as a catch-all phrase, 
allowing consideration of any other circumstance not previously 
enumerated. No reasonable juror could have thought that "any 
other circumstance" meant anything other than its plain and 
ordinary meaning—anything not previously considered. Because 
factor (k) was phrased in non-exclusive terms, CALJIC 8.84.1
10
permitted the type of individualized consideration required by 
the constitution.
This interpretation is consistent with this Courtis 
construction of the sentencing statutes of Florida and Texas. 
Florida’s death penalty statute in Proffitt v. Florida. 428 U.S. 
242 (1976), contained lists of aggravating and mitigating 
factors. Id. at 248-49 n.6. Language in the statute limited 
consideration of aggravating circumstances to those enumerated.3 
In approving the statute this Court held that since there was "no 
such limiting language introducing the list of statutory 
mitigating factors" the list was not exclusive. Id., at 249 n.8.
Texas* statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), made 
no explicit references to mitigating factors. Rather, the jury 
was merely required to answer two questions in the sentencing 
process.4 The statute was found constitutional because the Court
3, The language of the Florida statute explicitly provided 
that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the 
following [eight specified factors]." There was no such limiting 
language introducing the list of statutory mitigating factors.
428 U.S. at 249 n.8 (emphasis in original).
4. The three questions were as follows:
(1) whether the evidence established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the murder of the deceased was committed 
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death 
of the deceased or another would result,
(2) whether the evidence established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society.
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the defendants 
conduct in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to 
provocation, if any, by the victim.
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concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had broadly 
interpreted the second question“-despite its facial narrowness— 
as to permit the sentencer to consider "whatever mitigating 
circumstances" the defendant might be able to show. Id. at 272« 
73. Neither of these sentencing statutes explicitly informed the 
jury that it may consider mitigating factors which were not 
enumerated in the statute.
By comparison, CALJIC 8.84.1 presents an even clearer 
sentencing guideline. Factor (k) specifically instructed the 
jury to consider any other extenuating factors not listed in the 
instruction. It thus presents a stronger case than Proffitt or 
jurek where non-exclusiveness had to be inferred from the lack of 
limiting language. Discussing its rationale in upholding the 
Florida and Texas sentencing schemes, this Court stated that 
neither of them "clearly operated at that time to prevent the 
sentencer from considering any aspect of the defendant’s 
character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an 
independently mitigating factor." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607 
(emphasis added). In Boyde’s case, far from clearly limiting the 
jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence, factor (k) provided 
a much more explicit instruction than did either Proffitt or 
Jurek.
Boyde’s reliance on Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 
(1987), is misplaced. Hitchcock involved a Florida death-penalty
Jurek. 428 U.S. at 269.
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statute, which required the advisory Jury to determine whether
sufficient enumerated mitigating circumstances outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances. Id. at 395-96. Despite argument from 
defendant’s counsel that Hitchcock’s character and family 
background evidence should be considered, the trial judge 
believed that the court could only consider circumstances 
enumerated in the statute. Id_^^ at 398. This Court held that 
since the sentencing Judge refused to consider this evidence, the 
proceeding did not comport with the constitutional mandates of 
T.ockett. Id ■
Hitchcock is distinguishable because none of the statutory 
mitigating factors in the Florida statute instructed the Jury to 
consider any circumstance beyond those listed. The Florida 
statute contained no equivalent to factor (k). In fact, the 
Florida statute read much like that of CALJIC 8.84.1 without 
factor (k).5 As already discussed, factor (k) allows a Jury to 
consider mitigating factors which were not specifically 
enumerated in the statue. Boyde attempts to analogize Hitchcock
5. The Florida statute provided that the mitigating 
circumstances "shall be the following: that the defendant had no 
significant history of prior criminal activity; that the crime 
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; that the victim 
participated in or consented to the crime; that defendant was 
merely an accomplice whose participation in the crime was 
relatively minor; that the defendant acted under duress or 
domination; that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform that conduct tot he 
requirements of law was substantially impaired; and the age of 
the defendant at the time of the crime."
Hitchcock. 481 U.S. at 396.
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to his case on the basis that the trial judge in both instances 
instructed the jury to consider only statutory factors. However, 
Boyde ignores the fact the factor (k) refers to any circumstances 
so that the jury’s consideration of mitigating factors was not 
limited to those factors enumerated.
Boyde also mistakenly contends that amendments to factor (k) 
establish that the version given him was deficient. He cites
this Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, __  U.S. ___, 109
S.Ct. 1860 (1988 ), as authority. In Mills, this Court 
interpreted the Maryland death sentence verdict form as creating 
a substantial probability that reasonable jurors may have thought 
they could not consider any mitigating evidence unless all 12 
jurors agreed on the existence of a particular circumstance. Id, 
at 1870. The Court noted that, since petitioner’s case had been 
decided, the Maryland Court of Appeals had promulgated a new 
verdict form in which the section concerning mitigating 
circumstances had been completely rewritten. Id. at 1869. This 
Court inferred from such significant changes "some concern on the 
part of that court that juries could misunderstand the previous 
instruction." Id.
Boyde misinterprets the extent of the holding in Mills.
The Court stated "we are hesitant to infer too much about the 
prior verdict form from" the later revisions. 109 S.Ct. at 1869. 
The Court noted that the revision brought about "significant 
changes" in the instructions to the jury. Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, to contend, as Boyde does, that the changes made to factor
14
(k) establish its infirmity is to take Mills farther than this 
Court intended.
Factor (k) thus meets the first test for constitutionality 
discussed in Brown. Boyde was not denied individualized 
consideration called for in Lockett and therefore his sentence 
should stand.
2. A reasonable iuror could not have interpreted the
entire charge of CALJIC 8.84.1 as precluding 
consideration of Boyde*s character and background
evidence.
While it is not necessary to proceed to the second part of 
the Brown analysis outlined above, under this test Boyde’s claim 
would also fail. CALJIC 8.84.1 initially instructed the jury to 
consider "all of the evidence which has been received during any 
part of the trial of this case." The jury was then instructed to 
consider the enumerated factors, the last being factor (k). 
Together, the two instructions plainly directed the jury to 
consider all Boyde*s proffered evidence and determine if anything 
might call for a sentence less than death. The jury could not 
have reasonably believed that though they were permitted to hear 
Boyde's mitigating evidence presented and were told to consider 
all evidence, they could not consider the testimony concerning 
his character and background.
Boyde’s argument fails for inconsistency when factor (C) is 
considered. Boyde argues that because all the statutory factors 
listed in (a) - (j) concern circumstances immediately related to 
the crime, the jury could have construed factor (k) as relating
16
only to such circumstances. However, factor (c) directed the 
jury to consider ’’the presence or absence of any prior felony 
conviction.” Factor (c) has nothing to do with immediate 
circumstances of the crime. It concerns a defendant’s past and 
whether the past has been blemished with a felony conviction. 
Boyde, in fact, had numerous prior felony convictions which were 
brought out by the prosecution. Factor (c) thus required the 
Jury to consider Boyde * s past trouble with the law--a 
consideration which does not immediately relate the circumstances 
of the crime. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that 
the focus of factors (a) - (j) would mislead a juror into 
thinking that character and background evidence was irrelevant. 
Quite the contrary, it is unreasonable to contend that the Jury 
would think that it could consider background evidence which 
aggravated Boyde’s position but not that which mitigated it.
CALJIC 8.841.1 thus delivered a correct interpretation of 
the law. It instructed the Jury to consider all evidence 
presented and permitted consideration of background and character 
evidence through factor (k).
B. The jury could not have believed that factor (k)
excluded Bovde’s mitigating evidence when both counsel
argued as to the effect it should be given.
The Jury could not have reasonably believed that, though it 
was permitted to hear Boyde’s background and character evidence 
and both attorney’s arguments concerning that evidence, it could 
not consider that evidence.
This Court has recognized that when ascertaining what a
16
reasonable juror could have believed, consideration may be given
to statements made by counsel concerning jury instructions. In 
California v. Brown. 479 U.S. 638, Justice O’Connor in a 
concurring opinion stated that a court "should determine whether 
the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and considered in 
combination with the prosecutor’s closing argument, adequately 
informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the 
mitigating evidence introduced by the respondent." 479 U.S. at 
546 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This approach recognizes that 
the jury is influenced by the totality of instructions, evidence, 
and counsels* statements concerning weight and meaning of the 
evidence.
In Boyde’s case this is particularly true considering the 
amount of mitigating evidence presented. Boyde presented an 
abundance of evidence at the penalty stage, all relating to his 
background and character. He presented lengthy testimony from 
his family, friends, and psychologist concerning his broken home, 
his lack of education, his psychological disorders and his 
disposition as a giving person.
Moreover, Boyde’s mitigating evidence was presented last, 
just before counsels’ closing arguments. Boyde would have this 
Court believe that the jury entered into deliberation consciously 
disregarding all the testimony which was freshest in their minds. 
Considering that both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued 
extensively as to the weight to be given this evidence, such a 
contention is untenable. In his penalty phase argument, the
17
prosecutor stated:
Then we come to . . . "Any circumstance which extenuates the 
i?ravity of this crime" and what we have heard about this 
defendant is that he persistently lies, he’s got a low 
tolerance for frustration, he lacks patience, shows little 
or no effort to work in his life or contribute 
constructively to anything.
(J.A. 43). This statement was clearly in reference to testimony 
presented by Boyde’s family and friends about his character. He 
also stated:
If you look and you read what it says about 
extenuation, it says, "To lessen the seriousness of a crime 
as by giving an excuse." Nothing I have heard lessens the 
seriousness of this crime, nothing.
I am not willing to accept responsibility in this case 
for someone else, I am not willing to hold his mother 
responsible for it, I am not willing to hold his school 
responsible for him, I am not willing to hold the Youth 
Authority responsible for him.
(J.A. 46). Again, the prosecutor was referring to the background 
and character evidence presented by Boyde. And, while he was 
arguing that in his view the evidence did not sufficiently 
mitigate Boyde’s conduct, by doing so he necessarily indicated 
that consideration of the evidence was proper under factor (k). 
The prosecutor never stated nor even suggested that the 
background and character evidence could not be considered.
Defense counsel also argued that Boyde’s background and 
character evidence should be considered under factor (k). He 
referred to factor (k) as a catchall provision that allowed the 
Jury to consider the defendant as an individual. (J.A. 47). He 
explained to the jury that the type and number of potentially 
mitigating factors are too numerous to list and that the statute
18
drafters phrased factor (k) to account for any possible 
circumstance. Id. He then argued at length for giving great 
weight to Boyde’s proffered evidence in consideration of him as 
an individual. Id^ at 48. With regard to the statutory factors, 
the defense counsel told the .jury that '*we are not asking you to 
step outside these factors" but to consider them fully and ask 
"Can K outweigh A through J." Id_.
For Boyde’s contention to hold water, the jury must have 
believed that despite instructions directing them to consider all 
evidence, the factor (k) instruction, an abundance of mitigating 
evidence and counsels’ arguments as to its effect, they could not 
consider any factor not immediately related to the murder. Such a 
contention flies in the face of reason.
Boyde relies on Penrv v. Lvnaugh. __  U.S. __ , 109 S. Ct.
2934 (1989), for his contention that CALJIC 8.84.1 was 
unconstitutional under the circumstances despite presentation of 
mitigating evidence and counsels’ arguments. While this Court 
held that to be true in Penrv, the circumstances of that case are 
sufficiently different than the case at bar to render Penry 
inapplicable.
Penrv involved the same Texas sentencing statute as in 
Jurek, requiring the jury to answer three special issues.6
6. The three special issues are as follows;
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused 
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the 
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another 
would result;
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t 109 S.Ct. at 2942. Penry had presented evidence showing 
he was mentally retarded and was abused as a child. Id. at 2941. 
His counsel argued that if a juror believed that Penry, because 
of this mitigating evidence, did not deserve to be put to death, 
the juror should vote "no” on one of the special issues even if 
it believed the State had proved that the answer should be "yes.” 
"In rebuttal, the prosecution countered by stressing that the 
jurors had taken an oath to follow the law, and they must follow 
the instructions they were given in answering the special 
issues." Id. at 2950. The jury answered "yes" to all three 
issues and the court sentenced Penry to death. This Court 
reversed his sentence, holding that the combination of the 
prosecutor’s argument and the absence of appropriate jury 
instructions could lead a reasonable juror to believe that 
Penny’s mental retardation and childhood abuse evidence could not 
be considered. Id,, at 2950.
The effect of the prosecutor’s statements in Penry 
distinguish it from this case. The prosecutor in Penry 
effectively argued that the jury could not consider Penny’s 
mental retardation and childhood abuse evidence. And, it is
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of 
the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in 
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Penry. 109 S.Ct. at 2942.
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clear that the Penry Court considered the prosecutor’s improper
statements as a significant factor in its decision. By contrast,
the substance of the prosecutor’s argument in Boyde’s case was
that his mitigating evidence was relevant but inadequate.
Also, in determining that a special instruction was required
in Penrv. this Court focused on the peculiar circumstances of
Penny’s mental retardation and childhood abuse. 109 S.Ct. at
2948-60. This Court found that these particular circumstances
could not be given mitigating effect because of the strict "yes-
no" dichotomy of the sentencing statute. Id. The Court did not
hold that a special instruction would be required whenever any
background or character evidence was presented. Rather, just
that in Penny’s case evidence of mental retardation and child
abuse required a special instruction. The Penry decision must
accordingly be limited to the facts of that case.
II. CALJIC 8.84,2 PROPERLY ALLOWED JURORS TO WEIGH THE
RELEVANT AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS AND COME TO A 
REASONED MORAL JUDGMENT AS TO THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY UNDER 
ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
A. The sentencing .iurv must be given guided discretion, iji
deciding whether to impose the penalty of death.
A jury may not be given unbridled discretion in deciding 
whether to impose the sentence of death. Furman v. Georgia. 408 
U.S. 238 (1972). On the other hand, this Court has held that a 
state may not constitutionally make death mandatory for a 
specified crime. E.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S, 66 (1987) 
(mandatory death sentence for murder committed while serving life 
sentence without possibility of parole); Woodson v. North
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Carolina« 428 U.S. 280 ( 1976) (mandatory death sentence for first
degree murder).
Gregg V. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 ( 1976 ), decided the same day 
as Woodson, upheld a newly enacted Georgia capital sentencing 
statute designed to satisfy the constitutional deficiencies 
identified in Furman. The new statute provided, inter alia, that 
juries be directed to consider a list of ten statutory 
aggravating circumstances. In order to impose the death penalty, 
the jury was first required to find at least one aggravating 
circumstance to be true. Id. at 196-97. This scheme, since it 
first narrowed the class of individual defendants upon whom the 
death sentence might be imposed, and then required the jury to 
decide the appropriate sentence, limited the unguided discretion 
found constitutionally defective in Furman. Xd_s.
Thus, the constitution requires that a balance be struck 
between guidance and discretion. While the sentence of death may 
not be mandatory upon a mere finding of guilt, a jury may not be 
given untrammeled discretion to decide, without a concrete set of 
guidelines, whether a defendant should live or die.
Having established the constitutional framework within which 
a jury instruction must be examined, we turn to the instruction 
under which Boyde was sentenced to death.
B. Applying the Brown test to CALJIC 8.84.2, it is
apparent that Boyde*s jury could only have interpreted
^he_instruction as permitting it to make a reasoned
moral judgment as to the appropriate penalty under al_l 
the circumstances.
Applying the Brown test, this Court must decide what a
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reasonable juror could have understood CALJIC 8.84.2 as meaning.
"To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an 
instruction, la reviewing court] *must focus initially on the 
specific language challenged.’ (citation ommitted) If the 
specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review 
the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered 
a correct interpretation of the law." California v. Brown, 429 
U.S. 538 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315). In 
doing 80, it is appropriate to consider statements made by 
counsel during argument. Such statements may significantly 
impact the jury’s interpretation of an instruction, and are 
therefore relevant and helpful in construing a particular
instruction as a reasonable juror would. Penry v._Lynaugh, --
U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2934.
Applying the Brown test, the Court here must first examine 
the specific language of CALJIC 8.84.2.
1 . CALJIC 8.84.2 was interpreted by the jury as
requiring them to return a verdict of death onl_y: 
if they concluded that death was the appropriate 
penalty under all the circumstances.
CALJIC 8.84.2 was interpreted by Boyde’s jury as requiring 
it to sentence Boyde to death only if it deemed death to be the 
appropriate penalty under all the circumstances of the case. The 
portion of CALJIC 8.84.2 to which Boyde objects reads as follows: 
"If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death.
(J.A. 49).
23
Boyde arj^ues that this misled the jury as to its role in 
determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. In doing 
so, he adopts an artificial and implausible construction of the 
language of the instruction, and ignores the arguments made by 
the prosecution and defense counsel that belie the very interpre­
tation he argues is so plausible. Boyde claims that jurors may 
have felt compelled to return a sentence of death even if they 
personally felt that life without the possibility of parole would 
be the appropriate punishment. (Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, 
25, 26). The only interpretation to which the instruction is 
reasonably susceptible, however, is one which required the jurors 
to impose the death penalty only if they believed that death was 
the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. The 
language of the instruction did no more than to require that 
jurors, in accordance with their duty to apply the law, impose 
the death sentence if they unanimously decided it was 
appropriate. Through the use of CALJIC 8.84.2, the jury was 
admonished not to avoid reaching such a decision simply because 
of the potentially grave consequences of that decision and the 
great responsibility it entailed.
This interpretation is buttressed by statements made by the 
prosecutor during opening argument at the penalty phase. The 
prosecutor cautioned the jury as follows:
[Djon’t try to avoid the tough decision by sitting and 
trying to rationalize or trying to seek a way out of a tough 
decision, you are going to have to face it head on, you are 
going to have to go through each and every one of these 
factors and decide it. Is this the case, is this the kind 
of case as 1 am guided by these factors that warrants the
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death penalty.
(J.A. 44) (emphasis added). The prosecutor clearly and 
unequivocally informed the jury that the penalty of death could 
be imposed only if each juror personally decided that "[Boyde’s 
case is] the kind of case as I am guided by these factors that 
warrants the death penalty." Thus, the decision to impose the 
penalty of death was not reached as a result of any mandatory 
language in the instruction, but rather because each juror 
believed that it was the appropriate penalty for Boyde's crime.
The only aspect of the instruction that is arguably 
mandatory is the requirement that they not disregard their 
decision simply because of its serious consequences and their 
reluctance to shoulder the burden of deciding the fate of the 
defendant. The prosecutor recognized that this was a real 
possibility where, as here, the tremendous responsibility 
involved in making the decision was repeatedly driven home to the 
jury.
For this reason it is important to note that jurors were 
aware that the ultimate decision of whether death should be 
imposed rested solely with them. Boyde argues, citing Caldwell 
V. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320, 331-33 (1985), that the jury may 
have somehow been misled as to its role in the capital sentencing 
process. (Brief for Petitioner at 23.) Caldwell, however, is 
readily distinguishable from the present case.
In Caldwell. the Court vacated defendant’s death sentence 
because it found that arguments made by the prosecution during
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the penalty phase may have led jurors to believe that they played 
only a small* insubstantial role in determining the sentence.
The Court found that the jurors may have believed that the 
ultimate decision as to the appropriate penalty rested with an 
appellate court. The Court felt that a jury would, therefore, be 
more likely to impose the death penalty "to 'send a message’ of 
extreme disapproval for the defendant’s acts." 472 U.S. at 331. 
In Boyde’s case, however, jurors were repeatedly informed that 
they themselves would make the ultimate determination of the 
appropriate penalty. As noted above, the prosecutor repeatedly 
admonished the jury not to "try to avoid the tough decision, [but 
to] face it head on." (J.A. 44). He continued: "fYlou are going 
to have to go through each and every one of these factors and 
decide it." Id. (emphasis added). Defense counsel, during 
closing penalty phase argument, similarly informed jurors that 
the decision was theirs alone: "[W]hatever your judgment is, let
it be the best judgment you are capable of. . . . [Wjhatever your
decision is, we will abide." (J.A. 48) (emphasis added). It is,
therefore, almost inconceivable that the jury would not have 
understood that the decision to impose death rested with them 
alone.
Boyde also argues that the instruction is constitutionally 
deficient because "[t]he final determination of whether 
aggravating factors 'outweigh* mitigating factors . . . lacks 
specificity." (Brief for Petitioner at 23). He asserts that the 
failure of the statute to inform the jury "the amount necessary
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to tip the scale" one way or the other amounts to a defect of 
constitutional proportions. Id.
In support of this argument, Boyde points to the fact that 
California has subsequently revised CALJIC 8.84.2. This argument 
is unpersuasive. The mere fact that California has subsequently 
chosen to clarify and expand on the instruction to more 
explicitly inform the jury of its role does not mandate the 
conclusion that such a clarification was constitutionally 
required.
On the contrary, Boyde’s reliance on this revision to 
suggest that the former instruction was unconstitutional 
underscores his failure to cite any decision of this Court 
supporting his contention that the process prescribed by the 
revision is even desirable, not to mention constitutionally 
required. Indeed, this Court has never held that a trier of fact 
must conclude, before it may constitutionally impose the death 
penalty, that aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh 
mitigating circumstances. The Court has only required that, in 
order for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, there 
be some device, such as the presence of an aggravating 
circumstance, that serves the purpose of "narrowing the class of 
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death 
penalty." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1982); Gregg v. 
Georgia. 428 U.S. 153, 196-97. Having so narrowed the class, the 
trier of fact need only conclude that, in light of the various 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the penalty of death is
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warranted. Gregg. 428 U.S. at 197.
Likewise, this Court has never sought to intrude upon the 
decision-making function of capital sentencing Juries by 
imposing, as does the subsequently revised version of CALJIC 
8.84.2, a prescribed method of weighing aggravating against 
mitigating circumstances, , Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153.
Although California is, of course, free to do so if it chooses, 
nothing in any of the constitutional decisions of this Court 
requires it to. This argument, accordingly, must fail.
Boyde asserts that a recent "study" conducted by the Alameda 
County District Attorney’s Office concludes that the type of 
verdict form given the Jury "could impact its decision whether or 
not to impose the death penalty." (Brief for Petitioner at 33). 
He claims that "Juries instructed using a two step process—first 
weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating 
circumstances, then, second, determining the appropriate 
sentence—were more likely to return a verdict of life without 
parole than death." Id. Boyde further argues that since his 
Jury was not given such a verdict form his sentence must be 
reversed. Id.
This argument is also unpersuasive. Boyde’s mere bald 
assertion that, in a handful of isolated cases, there seem to be 
fewer death sentences imposed when a particular verdict form is 
used is simply not conclusive. These cases fall well short of 
demonstrating any clear defect in CALJIC 8.84.2. In any event, 
this is hardly the kind of evidence that would be sufficient to
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persuade this Court that Boyde*s jury was improperly instructed. 
This "study" has not been shown to be statistically significant, 
nor is it logically persuasive enough to require this Court to 
reverse Boyde’s sentence. This Court has, in the past, rejected 
more sophisticated studies than the one put forth here. Eg_i. 
Mr'nlt^skev V. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (Court rejects as 
inconclusive "two sophisticated statistical studies that examine 
over two-thousand murder cases" using two hundred and thirty 
variables and purportedly demonstrating a disparity in the 
imposition of death sentences based on race).
Since CALJIC 8.84.2, considered by itself, is clearly 
constitutionally sound under the first prong of the Brown test, 
it is not necessary for this Court to reach the second part of 
the Brown analysis, and the inquiry should end here. However, an 
examination of the entire charge lends further support to the 
conclusion that the jury was fully and accurately instructed 
regarding the nature and scope of its constitutional duties in 
imposing the penalty of death.
2. The entire charge was interpreted by the
reasenable juror as requiring a gualitative 
weighing of the various,a^g.rav.aAing—and miti^ating 
factors in deciding the appropriate penalty under 
all the circumstances.
The complete set of instructions read to the jury in the 
penalty phase of Boyde*s trial could only be interpreted by the 
reasonable juror as permitting a qualitative weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding whether death was 
the appropriate penalty for Boyde’s crimes.
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Prior to the judges reading of CALJIC 8.84.2, the jury was 
instructed with CALJIC 8.84.1 which reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows:
In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the 
Defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has 
been received during any part of the trial of this case.
You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the 
following factors. if applicable . . .
(J.A. 48-49) (emphasis added). The instruction then proceeds to 
enumerate eleven statutory aggravating and mitigating circum­
stances, (a) through (k).
These eleven factors do not indicate to the jury whether 
each should be considered to aggravate or mitigate the gravity of 
the offense. The instruction does not dictate to the jury how to 
assess the relative importance of the factors, nor does it 
prescribe to the jury the method by which it must conduct the 
weighing process. Jurors were merely instructed to "consider, 
take into account and be guided by" whichever factors they felt 
to be applicable.
Thus, it was left to each juror to first decide what 
bearing, if any, each factor has on the gravity of the offense.
In other words, did a particular factor mitigate or aggravate the 
crime? Second, each juror decided what relative weight ought to 
be attached to each factor. That is, how substantial was that 
factor in relation to the other statutory factors? The jury then 
proceeded to "consider, take into account, and be guided by" each 
factor in making the ultimate determination that death was the
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proper sentence.
The instruction did not require the Jury to mechanically 
count the factors that mitigate the offense and count those that 
aggravate the offense, imposing the death sentence if aggravating 
factors were slightly more numerous than mitigating ones. The 
weighing process was Just that--an intangible comparison of the 
relative substantiality and persuasiveness of the mitigating 
factors considered against the aggravating factors. At the 
completion of this process, the Jury decided which was more 
substantial in each Juror’s perception of the nature of the 
eleven factors, aggravating or mitigating, the weight to be given 
each factor, and the quantum of mitigating circumstances required 
to counterbalance any aggravating circumstances. In this way, 
the personal determination that the appropriate verdict is death 
was subsumed within each juror’s decision that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
Nevertheless, Boyde argues that the Jury "could have been 
confused concerning the nature of the weighing process" because 
the instruction "failed to specifically instruct that the 
weighing process is not a mere quantitative counting of factors 
on an imaginary scale but rather a qualitative balancing 
process." (Brief for Petitioner at 20). Boyde argues that the 
Jury may have been misled into believing that the weighing 
process was a quantitative, not a qualitative one. Id. at 30. 
This argument, "[wjhile strained in the abstract, ... is simply 
untenable when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances."
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Ca]ifornia v» Brown, 479 U»S. 538» 542 (1987).
Statements by both counsel directly refute petitioner’s 
argument. At opening penalty phase argument, the prosecutor 
advised the Jury that "lt]he process of weighing ... is a 
rational process, it is a process of being able to go through 
each factor, decide whether ... it aggravates or mitigates . .
. , consider that factor in relation to the other factors that
you'll hear, and come to a rational decision." (J.A. 42).
Defense counsel, at opening penalty phase argument, also 
unequivocally informed the jury of the qualitative nature of the 
weighing process:
Secondly, don’t play a numbers game. I like the word 
qua! itative. It says a lot. There is such a thing as a 
quantitative analysis. That is just totaling all things up 
on one side of the sheet, totaling up the things on another, 
deciding it on the sheer basis of numbers. . . . You have
^ot a qualitatiye analysis to go through here whic.h__means 
that when you _get down to the point of weighi_n_g^yi_de_n_ce_it
i_s not„_just a _questiqn__qf_.saying_hpw_man>i_crimes__di.d_he 
c ORm itj.._li n in5 _t hem __up.„agaijist_wh_at^..gpp_d_ deed s._he_may_haye
do ne._i n,_l if e,_lining those up then just making some sort of
analysis on _th_at_.
I am suggesting that vou do a qualitative analysis.
(J. A. 44) (emphasis added). Given this explicit statement, 
Boyde’s contention that the jury was not "specifically 
instruct[ed] that the weighing process is not a mere quantitative 
counting of factors" is difficult to comprehend.
As further support for his argument that the jury was misled 
into believing that it was to conduct a quantitative, mechanical 
counting of factors, Boyde quotes from statements made by the 
prosecutor during individual voir dire. He contends that, during
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questioning of four of the jurors, the prosecutor somehow 
mischaracterized the role of the jury in the penalty phase so as 
to lead a juror to believe '’that he or she had no choice but to 
return the death sentence." (Brief for Petitioner at 22-24). 
However, Boyde fails to cite any decision of this Court, and 
respondent has found none, supporting Boyde’s assertion that such 
statements may properly be considered by a reviewing court in 
assessing the jury’s interpretation of a challenged instruction.
Indeed, this Court, in Penry v. Lvnaugh. __  U.S. __ , 109
S.Ct. 2934, despite a careful examination of statements made by 
both counsel during the penalty phase argument of that case, did 
not feel it was appropriate to look to voir dire statements as 
indicative of what a reasonable juror could have understood the 
charge as meaning. Id. at 2949-50. Voir dire often takes place 
weeks or even months prior to the reading of jury instructions, 
and cannot have any meaningful effect on a jury’s later 
interpretation of an instruction. This is especially true where, 
as in this case, remarks by both counsel during penalty phase 
argument clearly outlined the jury’s duty, consistent with CALJIC 
8.84.2 itself, to conduct a qualitative analysis.
The California Supreme Court also rejected this approach in 
the present case:
The dissent . . . adopts the novel view, unsupported by any
cited authority, that remarks made by the prosecutor before 
trial to unsworn jurors during individual voir dire--which 
jurors have not yet been instructed on the law by the court- 
-carry forward to create reversible error in the penalty 
phase of the trial.
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People V. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 254, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 758
P.2d 25. This Court should not now embrace a rule that would 
require a reviewing court to scrutinize each and every offhand 
comment made by counsel during voir dire to determine whether 
such comments may have had some transient effect on the Jury’s 
later interpretation of its instructions.
Closing arguments, on the other hand, heard by Boyde’s jury 
immediately prior to being read CALJIC 8.84.2, are very helpful 
in determining the way in which the Jury may have approached the
weighing process. Penry, __  U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2949-50.
At closing, the prosecutor stated: "ll]t is not a process of 
counting . . . it is a process of weighing. And, you should
decide [for example] whether or not that one factor in mitigation 
outweighs all those factors in aggravation and then decide the 
case." (J.A. 47). He continued by telling Jurors to "think in 
your own mind and be guided by this one thing: The case, which 
according to law as given in the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, warrants the death penalty." (J.A. 47) (emphasis 
added) •
It is, therefore, clear that the Jury was aware that the 
weighing process was intended to be a qualitative one, permitting 
each Juror to come to a reasoned moral Judgment that death is the 
appropriate penalty.
C. This Court has consistently upheld sentencing schemes 
far more restrictive than the California scheme 
challenged here.
In a number of decisions, this Court has upheld death
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sentencing schemes that facially restrict the jury’s discretion 
to a much greater extent than CALJIC 8.84.2.
For example, in Jurek v. Texas. 428 U.S. 262 ( 1976), this 
Court upheld a Texas capital sentencing scheme which required the 
sentencing jury to merely answer three narrow questions. Id. at 
269. If the answer to any one of these questions is no, a 
sentence of life imprisonment automatically results. If the 
answer to all three questions is yes, the death sentence is 
automatically imposed. Id_, Under this procedure, the jury is 
given absolutely no discretion to decide the appropriateness of 
the penalty beyond that required to answer the three statutory 
questions, yet this Court held that such a scheme was in accord 
with the Constitution.
This court reviewed the same Texas capital sentencing scheme
just last term in Penry v._Lvnaugh. ___ U.S, __ , 109 S.Ct, 2934.
Although the Court vacated petitioner’s death sentence, it did so 
because the three narrow questions were held to have prevented 
jurors from considering mitigating evidence offered by the 
defense. Id. at 2952. The Court left undisturbed the Jurek 
Court’s determination that the Texas sentencing scheme did not 
improperly restrict the jury’s discretion despite the mandatory 
imposition of the sentence of death if the three statutory 
questions were answered in the affirmative. ld_. at 2945.
In the present case, the jurors were not stripped of the 
ultimate discretion to decide the appropriate penalty merely 
because any statutory questions were answered in a particular
35
way. On the contrary, Boyde’s jurors were explicitly told that 
they themselves were to weigh the relevant factors of aggravation 
and mitigation and impose the sentence of death only if they 
determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances.
CALJIC 8.84.2, like the Texas statute approved by this Court 
in Jurek and Penry, "guides and focuses the jury’s objective 
consideration of the particularized circumstances of the 
individual offense and the individual offender before it can 
impose a sentence of death." Jurek. 428 U.S. at 274 .
CONCLUSION
In sum, Boyde’s jury was permitted to hear and give effect 
to all evidence introduced in mitigation of the crime, and was 
not required to impose the death penalty unless it deemed it to 
be the appropriate and just penalty under all the circumstances. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of the 
California Supreme Court.
Dated: November 14, 1989
Respectfully submitted,
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